Utah v. 1986 Red Toyota 4-Runner bearing VIN JT4RN620G0057623 : Brief of Respondent by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Utah v. 1986 Red Toyota 4-Runner bearing VIN
JT4RN620G0057623 : Brief of Respondent
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Steven V. Major; Deputy Davids County Attorney; Attorney for Appellant.
David Paul White; Attorney at Law; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah v. 1986 Red Toyota 4-Runner bearing VIN JT4RN620G0057623, No. 900388 (Utah Court of Appeals,
1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2765
*
M
 COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
1986 Red Toyota 4-Runner 
bearing VIN JT4RN620G0057623, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 900388-CA 
Supreme Court Case No. 900150 
Priority No. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from a Judgment entered in the Second 
District Court in and for the County of Davis, State of Utah 
Hon. Douglas L Cornaby, Judge, Presiding 
Steven V. Major 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Attorney for Appellant 
David Paul White 
Attorney at Law 
144 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Constance Gartrell 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. ] 
1986 Red Toyota 4-Runner 
bearing VIN JT4RN620G0057623, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. ] 
i BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
i Court of Appeals 
i Case No. 900388-CA 
i Supreme Court Case No. 900150 
I Priority No. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from a Judgment entered in the Second 
District Court in and for the County of Davis, State of Utah 
Hon. Douglas L Cornaby, Judge, Presiding 
David Paul White 
Attorney at Law 
144 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
Attorney for Respondent, 
Constance Gartrell 
Steven V. Major 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, UT 84025 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION/NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 2 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 2 
FACTS 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 4 
Standard of Review 4 
POINT 1: Mr. JENKINS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE AND DID NOT 
CONSENT TO THE ALLEGED CRIME 4 
POINT 2: MRS. GARTRELL WAS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER 
OF THE VEHICLE 5 
POINT 3: THE TITLE TO THE VEHICLE NEVER VESTED 
WITH THE STATE 5 
POINT 4: THE STATE MISCHARACTERIZES THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDINGS 8 
POINT 5: THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD CLAIMANT 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS FOR THIS APPEAL 9 
CONCLUSION 9 
ADDENDUM 10 
i 
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING 
1986 Red Toyota 4-Runner bearing VIN JT4RN620G0057623 (hereinafter, 
"vehicle"). This vehicle is the defendant in this suit and was held not subject to forfeiture 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13 et seq. 
Brian Jenkins (hereinafter, "Mr. Jenkins"), owned the vehicle at the time of the 
criminal act and at the time of its seizure. Jenkins then sold his interest in the vehicle to 
Constance Gartrell. 
Constance Gartrell (hereinafter "Mrs. Gartrell"), is the claimant and respondent. 
She purchased Jenkins' interest in the vehicle for $9,000 after the vehicle had been 
impounded for lapsed registration and before the State had issued a notice of seizure. 
Troy Gartrell (hereinafter "Troy"), is the son of Mrs. Gartrell. 
ii 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
1986 Red Toyota 4-Runner ] 
bearing VIN JT4RN620G0057623, ] 
Defendant/Respondent. ] 
i BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
i Court of Appeals 
i Case No. 900388-CA 
I Supreme Court Case No. 900150 
I Priority No. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION/NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
I. The state appealed this case to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)(j) (1953). The Utah Supreme Court transferred this case to the 
Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(4). 
II. This is an appeal brought by the State of Utah on a forfeiture action filed in 
the Second Judicial District Court of Utah in an in rem proceeding against a vehicle owned 
by Mrs. Gartrell. A trial was held before the Honorable Douglas L Cornaby on January 
25,1990. The court denied the state's request for forfeiture of the vehicle. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court was within its discretion when it found that Constance 
Gartrell lawfully purchased the vehicle from its previous owner, Brad Jenkins. 
2. Whether Mr. Jenkins had knowledge or consent of the violation pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13. 
3. Whether the vehicle seized by the state was subject to forfeiture pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1) (1987, as amended), is determinative and the entire 
statute is set forth as an addendum to this brief. The particular section of this code in 
question is as follows: 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason of any 
act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or 
consent; 
FACTS 
Respondent does not dispute the facts as listed in Appellant's Brief. The following 
facts are meant to supplement those facts already set forth. 
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1. Mr. Jenkins was the owner of the vehicle, having purchased it sometime 
before January 1989. (Tr. 60.) 
2, On January 14,1989, Mrs. Gartrell purchased the vehicle from Mr. Jenkins 
for $9,000. (Tr. 99-100.) 
3- Neither Mr. Jenkins nor Mrs. Gartrell testified that they knew of or consented 
to Mike Gartrell or any other person keeping controlled substances in the vehicle. 
4. Prior to Mrs. Gartrell purchasing the vehicle, Mr. Jenkins took the vehicle to 
Troy Gartrell's house so that Mr. Gartrell could have a mechanic check it. (Tr. 62.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Mrs. Gartrell's vehicle was never forfeitable under the terms of Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-13 because the vehicle was seized when it was lawfully owned by Mr. Jenkins who 
had no knowledge or consent of the violation. Mrs. Gartrell then lawfully purchased the 
vehicle from Mr. Jenkins. 
The state's arguments fail because those arguments do not take into account the 
exception provisions requiring that the owner of a vehicle have knowledge or give consent 
to the violation. The state's arguments also fail because those arguments assume that 
the state's interest in the seized property automatically vest whether or not the property 
is forfeitable under the statute. 
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Even if the state obtains an unperfected interest in the seized property, that interest 
never becomes perfect if it is later determined that the property is not forfeitable because 
the owner lacked the requisite knowledge or consent. 
ARGUMENT 
Standard of Review 
The standard of review is whether the findings made by the lower court were 
clearly erroneous pursuant to Utah R. of Civ. Pro. 52. 
POINT 1: MR. JENKINS HAD NO KNOWLEDGE AND DID NOT 
CONSENT TO THE ALLEGED CRIME. 
Mr. Jenkins owned the vehicle at the time of the criminal act and at the time of the 
seizure. (Tr. 60) Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1 )(e)(i) provides an express exemption to 
forfeiture when the criminal act occurs without the owner's knowledge or consent. 
Although Mr. Jenkins was called as a state witness, the State failed to established that he 
knew of or consented to the criminal act. (Tr. 59-72.) In short, the state failed in its 
burden to show whether Mr. Jenkins had any connection with the crime pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §58-37-13(1)(e)(ii). The trial court was therefore well within its discretion to find 
the vehicle was not forfeitable and such a finding was not clearly erroneous. 
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POINT 2: MRS. GARTRELL WAS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE 
VEHICLE. 
Mrs. Gartreil purchased Mr. Jenkins' interest in the vehicle for full value after the 
vehicle had been impounded for improper registration and before the state's notice of 
seizure. (Jr. 71-72.) Mr. Jenkins testified that Mrs. Gartreil paid for the vehicle with a 
$10,000 cashiers check. (Tr. 71.) She received $1,000 back for registration, insurance 
et cet., making the total purchase price $9,000. (Tr. 112). 
Because Mrs. Gartreil made a bona fide purchase from an owner who fell within 
the statutory exemption, and because she neither knew of nor consented to the criminal 
act, her ownership is exempt from forfeiture. The trial court's finding that she lawfully 
purchased the vehicle was therefore not clearly erroneous. 
POINT 3: THE TITLE TO THE VEHICLE NEVER VESTED WITH THE 
STATE. 
The State cites this Court's opinion in State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-
Nine. 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 40 (1990) for the proposition that forfeited property immediately 
vests with the state. (Appellant's Brief at 6.) Appellant misses the point that the trial court 
found that the vehicle was not forfeitable and therefore could not vest with the state 
because it could not be forfeited pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §58-37-14(1) (e)(ii). 
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The State concedes that Mr. Jenkins owned the car on January 6,1990, the date 
of the violation. (Appellant's Brief at 6.) Yet, the State fails to note that Mr. Jenkins' 
ownership renders the vehicle unforfeitable. (Conclusion of Law No. 4.) Assuming, 
arguendo, that some sort of interest does indeed vest upon commission of a criminal act, 
that interest would be inchoate and unperfected subject to the judicial rights provided in 
the statute for the protection of innocent owners. Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(9). If that 
were the case, the State's rights would become perfected and capable of extinguishing 
conflicting claims only after the innocent claimant's rights had been adjudicated. 
The instant vesting discussed in U.S. v. Nichols. 841 F.2d 1489, (10th Cir 1989) is 
the result of an explicit, considered amendment to the federal forfeiture statute. The 
closest parallel to the federal approach in the Utah statute appears in Utah Code Ann. 
§58-37-13(1 )(a-d), which extinguishes all property rights in certain res. Nichols. 841 F.2d 
at 1486-89. 
Assuming for the sake of argument that some right had vested in the state under 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-(e), that right would still be subject to the adjudication of the 
rights of innocent owners under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1)(e)(ii) and -(9). 
U.S. v. Stowell. 133 U.S. 1; 10 S.Ct. 244, (1890), explains the nature and effect of 
the portion of the State's interest that instantly vests in the state at the time of the crime. 
It being admitted that the business of a distiller was not carried on with the 
mortgagee's permission or connivance, and that he did not even know, until 
after the seizure, that a still had been set upon the premises, it follows, for 
the reasons already stated in discission the construction and effect of the 
statutes in question, that the mortgage is a lien as against the United States. 
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Stowell 10 S.Ct. at 248. Similarly, the Utah statute protects the rights of third parties in 
the res from forfeiture. State v. One 1983 Pontiac. 717 P.2d 1338, 1341 (Utah 1986). 
The doctrine of the Guilty Res is explained in Florida Dealers and Growers Bank 
v. U.S.. 279 F.2d 673, 677 (Fifth Cir. 1960). 
In a forfeiture proceeding it is the property that is proceeded against. 
The vehicle is held guilty as if it were a sentient being. (Cites omitted). 
Under the doctrine of relation back, the illegal use of the automobile vests 
title in the Government from the time of the vehicle's commission of the 
crime and cuts off all "property rights" of others in the automobile. By its 
nature, the remission statute assumes the validity of the forfeiture but also 
assumes that outstanding interests in property and bona fide claims to 
property are not snuffed out by the car's guilt. They continue viable, at least 
to the extent of permitting innocent persons to ask that the sovereign temper 
the strictness of the rule of forfeiture when there are equitable grounds for 
relief. 
In short, we recognize the full effect of the forfeiture for the purpose 
of vesting title in the United States. Indeed the validity of the forfeiture is 
not at issue in this case. What is of substance and at issue here is whether 
under the real, as opposed to the assumed, facts of this case, the claimants 
have such interest in the forfeited property as to permit the district judge to 
consider whether, in the exercise of a sound discretion, he should or should 
not grant remission of the forfeiture.... 
Florida Dealers. 279 F.2d at 677. 
In the present case, the lower court determined that Mrs. Gartrell purchased the 
vehicle from an innocent owner and therefore the vehicle could not be forfeited. 
Therefore, any inchoate vesting remained unperfected and Mrs. Gartrell's claim should 
prevail. 
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The State's argument that title vests at the instant of criminal use is irrelevant, since 
the only vehicle title that can vest under Utah Code Ann. §58-37-13(1 )(e) is that of a 
criminal owner or an owner in league with a criminal borrower. Neither of these legitimate 
forfeiture scenarios is present in this case. Rather, this case presents a chain of title 
between two parties innocent of the criminal possession of drugs. 
In short, the fact that the State does or does not have an inchoate interest upon 
seizure becomes irrelevant when that seizure does not result in a legal forfeiture. 
Therefore, Mrs. Gartrell's interest in the car cannot be extinguished. 
POINT 4: THE STATE MISCHARACTERIZES THE TRIAL COURT'S 
FINDINGS. 
The State claims that Mrs. Gartrell could not have any interest in the vehicle 
because the lower court held that the vehicle "was seized and forfeitable." (Appellant's 
Brief at 8.) This statement mischaracterizes the lower court's findings. The lower court 
found that the car was properly seized. (Finding No. 1.) However, the lower court never 
found that the vehicle was forfeitable. Instead, the lower court found that the State could 
not forfeit the vehicle. (Conclusion No. 4). In other words, if the state cannot forfeit a 
vehicle, that vehicle is not forfeitable. 
The State relies on many cases for its proposition that a third party cannot obtain 
title or interest to property after it has been seized by the state. The cases however, refer 
tp property that has been seized and later deemed forfeitable. The mere act of seizure, 
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absent the property being deemed forfeitable, does not vest an exclusive property interest 
in the state. In fact, the statute has specific safeguards to protect the interests of innocent 
owners and innocent holders of security interests. 
POINT 5: THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD CLAIMANT ATTORNEY FEES 
AND COSTS FOR THIS APPEAL. 
This Court should award attorneys fees for the cost of the appeal because the 
appeal of this action was without merit and not brought in good faith. The State's appeal 
depends on ill-conceived theories which are unrelated to the heart of the applicable 
statute. 
The State's appeal was not brought in good faith because the state totally 
overlooked the statutory consideration of third party rights under Utah Code Ann. §58-
37-13(1)(e). This statute was the same statute the state used for its case. The State's 
lack of good faith is further shown by its failure to consider how its theory is not 
supported even in the cases they cite. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should affirm the trial court's conclusion 
that the vehicle was not forfeitable. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /<* day of August, 1990. 
David Paul White v 
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Utah Code Ann., Section 58-37-13 (1987, as amended) §t seq. 
B. District Court Judgement and Findings of Fact 
10 
A: UTAH CODE ANN,, SECTION 58-37-13 
58-37-13. Property subject to forfeiture — Seizure — Pro-
cedure. 
(1) The following are subject to forfeiture, and no property right exists in 
them: 
(a) all controlled substances which have been manufactured, distrib-
uted, dispensed, or acquired in violation of this act; 
(b) all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind used, or 
intended for use, in manufacturing, compounding, processing, delivering, 
importing, or exporting any controlled substance in violation of this act; 
(c) all property used or intended for use as a container for property 
described in Subsections (l)(a) and (1Kb); 
(d) all hypodermic needles, syringes, and other paraphernalia, not in-
cluding capsules used with health food supplements and herbs, used or 
intended for use to administer controlled substances in violation of this 
act; 
(e) all conveyances including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels used or in-
tended for use, to transport, or in any manner facilitate the transporta-
tion, sale, receipt, simple possession, or concealment of property described 
in Subsections (l)(a) or (1Kb), except that: 
(i) a conveyance used by any person as a common carrier in the 
transaction of business as a common carrier may not be forfeited 
under this section unless it appears that the owner or other person in 
charge of the conveyance was a consenting party or privy to violation 
of this act; 
(ii) a conveyance may not be forfeited under this section by reason 
of any act or omission committed or omitted without the owner's 
knowledge or consent; and 
(iii) any forfeiture of a conveyance subject to a bona fide security 
interest is subject to the interest of a secured party who could not 
have known in the exercise of reasonable diligence that a violation 
would or did take place in the use of the conveyance; 
(f) all books, records, and research, including formulas, microfilm, 
tapes, and data used or intended for use in violation of this act; 
(g) everything of value furnished or intended to be furnished in ex-
change for a controlled substance in violation of this act, all proceeds 
traceable to any violation of this act, and all moneys, negotiable instru-
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ments, and securities used or intended to be used to facilitate any viola-
tion of this act; but: 
(i) An interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsec-
tion if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made 
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the 
act; 
(ii) There is a rebuttable presumption that all money, coins, and 
currency found in proximity to forfeitable controlled substances, drug 
manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia, or to forfeitable 
records of the importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled 
substances are forfeitable under this section; the burden of proof is 
upon claimants of the property to rebut this presumption; 
(h) all imitation controlled substances as defined in the Imitation Con-
trolled Substances Act; and 
(i) all warehousing, housing, and storage facilities, or interest in real 
property of any kind used, or intended for use, in producing, cultivating, 
warehousing, storing, protecting, or manufacturing any controlled sub-
stances in violation of this chapter, except that: 
(i) any forfeiture of a housing, warehousing, or storage facility or 
interest in real property is subject to the bona fide security interest of 
a party who could not have known in the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence that a violation would take place on the property; 
(ii) an interest in property may not be forfeited under this subsec-
tion if the holder of the interest did not know of the act which made 
the property subject to forfeiture, or did not willingly consent to the 
act; 
(iii) unless the premises are used in producing, cultivating, or 
manufacturing controlled substances, a housing, warehousing, or 
storage facility or interest in real property may not be forfeited under 
this section unless cumulative sales of controlled substances on the 
property within a two-month period total or exceed $1,000, or the 
street value of any controlled substances found on the premises at 
any given time totals or exceeds $1,000. A narcotics officer experi-
enced in controlled substances law enforcement may testify to estab-
lish the street value of the controlled substances for purposes of this 
subsection. 
(2) Property subject to forfeiture under this act may be seized by any peace 
officer of this state upon process issued by any court having jurisdiction over 
the property. However, seizure without process may be made when: 
(a) the seizure is incident to an arrest or search under a search warrant 
or an inspection under an administrative inspection warrant; 
(b) the property subject to seizure has been the subject of a prior judg-
ment in favor of the state in a criminal injunction or forfeiture proceeding 
under this act; 
(c) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property is 
directly or indirectly dangerous to health or safety; or 
(d) the peace officer has probable cause to believe that the property has 
been used or intended to be used in violation of this act. 
(3) In the event of seizure under Subsection (2), proceedings under Subsec-
tion (4) shall be instituted promptly. 
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(4) Property taken or detained under this section is not repleviable but is in 
custody of the law enforcement agency making the seizure, subject only to the 
orders and decrees of the court or the official having jurisdiction. When prop-
erty is seized under this act the appropriate person or agency may: 
(a) place the property under seal; 
(b) remove the property to a place designated by it or the warrant 
under which it was seized; or 
(c) take custody of the property and remove it to an appropriate loca-
tion for disposition in accordance with law. 
(5) All substances listed in Schedule I that are possessed, transferred, dis-
tributed, or offered for distribution in violation of this act are contraband and 
shall be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. Similarly, all substances 
listed in Schedule I which are seized or come into the possession of the state 
are contraband and shall be summarily forfeited to the state if the owners are 
unknown. 
(6) All species of plants from which controlled substances in Schedules I 
and II are derived which have been planted or cultivated in violation of this 
act, or of which the owners or cultivators are unknown, or are wild growths, 
may be seized and summarily forfeited to the state. 
(7) Failure, upon demand by the department or its authorized agent, of any 
person in occupancy or in control of land or premises upon which species of 
plants are growing or being stored, to produce an appropriate license or proof 
that he is the holder of a license, is authority for the seizure and forfeiture of 
the plants. 
(8) When any property is forfeited under this act by a finding of the court 
that no person is entitled to recover the property, it shall be deposited in the 
custody of the Division of Finance. Disposition of all property is as follows: 
(a) The state may include in its complaint seeking forfeiture, a request 
that the seizing agency be awarded the property. Upon a finding that the 
seizing agency is able to use the forfeited property in the enforcement of 
controlled substances laws, the district court having jurisdiction over the 
case shall award the property to the seizing agency. The seizing agency 
shall pay to the prosecuting agency the legal costs incurred in filing and 
pursuing the forfeiture action. Property forfeited under this section may 
not be applied by the court to costs or fines assessed against any defen-
dant in the case. 
(b) The seizing agency, or if it makes no application, any state agency, 
bureau, county, or municipality, which demonstrates a need for specific 
property or classes of property subject to forfeiture shall be given the 
property for use in enforcement of controlled substances laws upon the 
payment of costs to the county attorney for legal costs for filing and 
pursuing the forfeiture and upon application for the property to the direc-
tor of the Division of Finance. The application shall clearly set forth the 
need for the property and the use to which the property will be put. 
(c) The director of the Division of Finance shall review all applications 
for property submitted under Subsection (8Mb) and, if the seizing agency 
makes no application, make a determination based on necessity and ad-
visability as to final disposition and shall notify the designated applicant 
or seizing agency, where no application is made, \yho may obtain the 
property upon payment of all costs to the appropriate department. The 
Division of Finance shall in turn reimburse the prosecuting agency or 
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agencies for costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture action, not to ex-
ceed the amount of the net proceeds received for the sale of the property. 
Any proceeds remaining after payment shall be returned to the seizing 
agency or agencies. 
(d) If no disposition is made upon an application under Subsection 
(8)(a) or (b), the director of the Division of Finance shall dispose of the 
property by public bidding or where deemed appropriate, by destruction. 
Proof of destruction shall be upon oath of two officers or employees of the 
department having charge of the property, and verified by the director of 
the department or his designated agent. 
(9) When any property is subject to forfeiture, a determination for forfeiture 
to the state shall be made as follows: 
(a) A complaint verified on oath or affirmation shall be prepared by the 
county attorney where the property was seized or is to be seized and filed 
in the district court. The complaint shall describe with reasonable partic-
ularity: 
(i) the property which is the subject matter of the proceeding; 
(ii) the date and place of seizure, if known; and 
(iii) the allegations which constitute a basis for forfeiture. 
(b) Upon filing the complaint, the clerk of the district court shall forth-
with issue a warrant for seizure of the property which is the subject 
matter of the action and deliver it to the sheriff for service, unless the 
property has previously been seized without a warrant, under Subsection 
58-37-13(2). 
(c) Notice of the seizure and intended forfeiture shall be filed with the 
county clerk, and served together with a copy of the complaint, upon all 
persons known to the county attorney to have a claim in the property by 
one of the following methods: 
(i) upon each claimant whose name and address is known, at the 
last known address of the claimant, or upon each owner whose right, 
title, or interest is of record in the Division of Motor Vehicles, by 
mailing a copy of the notice and complaint by certified mail to the 
address given upon the records of the division, which service is 
deemed complete even though the mail is refused or cannot be for-
warded; and 
(ii) upon all other claimants whose addresses are unknown, but 
who are believed to have an interest in the property, by one publica-
tion in a newspaper of general circulation in the county where the 
seizure was made. 
(d) Except under Subsection (8)(c), any claimant or interested party 
shall file with the court a verified answer to the complaint within 20 days 
after service has been obtained. 
(e) When property is seized under this act, any interested person or 
claimant of the property, prior to being served with a complaint under 
this section, may file a petition in the district court for release of his 
interest in the property. The petition shall specify the claimant's interest 
in the property and his right to have it released. A copy shall be served 
upon the county attorney in the county of the seizure, who shall answer 
the petition within 20 days. A petitioner need not answer a complaint of 
forfeiture. 
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(0 After 20 days following service of a complaint or petition for release, 
the court shall examine the record and if no answer is on file, the court 
shall allow the complainant or petitioner an opportunity to present evi-
dence in support of his claim and order forfeiture or release of the prop-
erty as the court determines. If the county attorney has not filed an 
answer to a petition for release and the court determines from the evi-
dence that the petitioner is not entitled to recovery of the property, it 
shall enter an order directing the county attorney to answer the petition 
within ten days. If no answer is filed within that period, the court shall 
order the release of the property to the petitioner entitled to receive it. 
(g) When an answer to a complaint or petition appears of record at the 
end of 20 days, the court shall set the matter for hearing within 20 days. 
At this hearing all interested parties may present evidence of their rights 
of release of the property following the state's evidence for forfeiture. The 
court shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence the issues in the 
case and order forfeiture or release of the property as it determines. 
(h) Proceedings of this section are independent of any other proceed-
ings, whether civil or criminal, under this act or the laws of this state. 
(i) When the court determines that claimants have no right in the 
property in whole or in part, it shall declare the property to be forfeited 
and direct it to be delivered to the custody of the Division of Finance. The 
division shall dispose of the property under Subsection (8). 
(j) When the court determines that property, in whole or in part, is not 
subject to forfeiture, it shall order release of the property to the proper 
claimant. If the court determines that the property is subject to forfeiture 
and release in part, it shall order partial release and partial forfeiture. 
When the property cannot be divided for partial forfeiture and release, 
the court shall order it sold and the proceeds distributed: 
(i) first, proportionally among the legitimate claimants; 
(ii) second, to defray the costs of the action, including seizure, stor-
age of the property, legal costs of filing and pursuing the forfeiture, 
and costs of sale; and 
(iii) third, to the Division of Finance for the General Fund. 
(k) In a proceeding under this section where forfeiture is declared, in 
whole or in part, the court shall assess all costs of the forfeiture proceed-
ing, including seizure and storage of the property, against the individual 
or individuals whose conduct was the basis of the forfeiture, and may 
assess costs against any other claimant or claimants to the property as 
appropriate. 
History: L. 1971, ch. 145, $ 13; 1982, ch. act" means Laws 1971, ch. 145. which enacted 
12, § 2; 1982, ch. 32, § 9; 1987, ch. 87, 5 2. this chapter. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend- Imitation Controlled Substances Act. — 
ment, effective July 1, 1987. rewrote this sec- The ImiUtion Controlled Subsunces Act, re-
turn to the extent that a deUiled analysis is {exred to in Subsection a»«h), appears as 
impracticable. §§ 58-37b-l to 58-37b-8. 
Meaning of "this act.** — The term "this 
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B: DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT AND FINDINGS OF FACT 
i' 
DAVID PAUL WHITE (3441) 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
144 SOUTH 500 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-8288 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ; 
1986 RED TOYOTA 4-RUNNER, 
BEARING VIN JT4RN6203G0057623 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 45023 
i Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
Trial was held in above-entitled action before the Honorable 
Douglas L. Cornaby on January 25, 1990. State of Utah was present 
and represented by Steve Majors; Defendant/Claimant, Constance 
Gartrell was present and represented by her counsel, David Paul 
White. The Court having heard all of the evidence produced and 
having considered documentation entered into evidence, now makes 
the following ORDER: 
Said vehicle being 1986 Toyota 4-Runner bearing VIN 
JT4RN6203G0057623 cannot be forfeited by the State of Utah and is 
ordered returned to Constance Gartrell. 
DATED this day of , 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Douglas L. Cornaby 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
15 
Steve Majors 
DAVID PAUL WHITE (3441) 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT 
144 SOUTH 500 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84102 
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-8288 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ; 
1986 RED TOYOTA 4-RUNNER, 
BEARING VIN JT4RN6203G0057623 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
I CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Case No. 45023 
I Judge Douglas L. Cornaby 
COMES NOW, the above-entitled Defendant, by and through its 
counsel, David Paul White, and files the following Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1. The vehicle in question was properly seized and impounded 
on January 6, 1989, because of improper registration and operator 
was driving on suspended license. 
2. Vehicle properly searched pursuant to impound on January 
14, 1989. Constance Gartrell made lawful purchase of said vehicle 
from previous owner, Brad Jenkins. 
3. State1s notice of its intent to seize and forfeite was 
mailed to Constance Gartrell on January 16, 1989. 
4. Complaint for forfeiture filed on January 16, 1989. 
Constance Gartrell answered said Complaint as a Claimant and 
interested party on said vehicle and trial on said Complaint was 
held before the above-entitled Court on January 25, 1990 • On the 
foregoing findings of fact, the Court now makes the following 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Said vehicle was properly seized and impounded. 
2. Inventory search of said vehicle was done properly and in 
the regular course of police officer procedure. 
3. Constance Gartrell was an innocent purchaser of said 
vehicle. 
4. State of Utah cannot forfeiture said vehicle and said 
vehicle must be returned to Constance Gartrell. 
DATED this day of Febraury, 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
Douglas L. Cornaby 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Steve Majors 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
'. SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE j 
DAVID PAUL WHITE, being duly sworn, states that he is the attorney for the 
Respondent and that he served four (4) copies of the Brief of Respondent upon: 
Steven V. Major 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 618 
Farmington, UT 84025 
AND that he did serve ten (10) copies of the Brief of Respondent upon: 
Clerk, Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
by personally delivering true copies thereof, on the }(J> day of August, 1990. 
David Paul White* 
Attorney for Respondent 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this {U> day of August, 1990. 
TBSSS J ^otar/Public 
*—••»—•••••«•—•——— ()My Commission Expires: 3 ' 2 "^3 
Residing at Salt Lake County 
11 
